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When multinational firms expand their operations in tax havens, do they divert 
activity from non-havens?  Much of the debate on tax competition presumes that the 
answer to this question is yes.  This paper offers a model for examining the relationship 
between activity in havens and non-havens, and discusses the implications of recent 
evidence in light of that model.  Properly interpreted, the evidence suggests that tax 
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1. Introduction 
Economic federations typically struggle with the impact and desirability of tax policy 
diversity among member states.  In particular, there is widespread concern that low-tax areas 
within a federation impose a fiscal externality on other countries in attracting investment that 
would otherwise locate in high-tax areas within the same regions.  There are no reliable estimates 
of the magnitude of such diversion.  Moreover, there has been little consideration of the 
possibility that reducing the costs of using of low-tax jurisdictions facilitates foreign investment 
and economic activity in high-tax jurisdictions within the same regions.  The latter possibility 
arises if the ability to relocate taxable profits into low-tax jurisdictions increases the return to 
investing in high-tax areas, if low-tax jurisdictions facilitate deferral of home-country taxation of 
income earned elsewhere, or if affiliates in low-tax areas offer valuable intermediate goods and 
services to affiliates in high-tax areas. 
Tax havens also figure prominently in current debates over the scope and consequences 
of tax competition.  Countries competing for mobile foreign investment may have incentives to 
reduce taxes to levels below what they would be in the absence of foreign competition; indeed, 
there are circumstances in which international tax competition drives optimizing governments to 
reduce all capital tax rates to zero.1  Tax havens are widely believed to accelerate the process of 
tax competition between governments.  However, it is conceivable that the tax avoidance 
opportunities presented by tax havens allow other countries to maintain high capital tax rates 
without suffering dramatic reductions in foreign direct investment.  Hence the proliferation and 
widespread use of tax havens may retard what would otherwise be aggressive competition 
between other countries to reduce taxes in order to attract and maintain investment.  Indeed, 
                                                 
1 The literature on tax competition since Oates (1972), as reviewed in Wilson (1999) and Gordon and Hines (2002), 
has largely been theoretical, and focused on the possibility that tax competition may result in an inefficient 
underprovision of public goods.  An alternative stream of this literature emphasizes the virtues of tax competition in 
restraining an expansive state, as argued in Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and modeled in Edwards and Keen 
(1996).  Further extensions of these models incorporate the political economy of fiscal policy and explore the 
associated consequences for the efficiency of tax competition, as in Gordon and Wilson (2003) and Janeba and 
Schjelderup (2002).  Empirical efforts to consider the salience or consequences of tax competition include 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002), who estimate parameters of reaction functions within the OECD to 
measure the extent to which tax competition has operated between 1982 and 1999, and Mendoza and Tesar (2002), 
who simulate the dynamics of tax competition within Europe.  Buettner (2003) analyzes fiscal competition within 
Germany by considering the investment effects of tax policies in adjacent jurisdictions. 
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despite the incentives in place to compete over tax rates, the tax burden on corporate income in 
OECD countries has fallen little, if at all, over the past 25 years (see Griffith and Klemm (2004)). 
This paper presents a model that can be used to analyze the implications of evidence that 
firms with growing activity in high-tax countries are also the firms most likely to initiate tax 
haven operations.  The complementarity between haven and non-haven activity, evident in this 
empirical pattern, implies that reduced costs of using tax havens are likely to stimulate 
investment in nearby high-tax countries.  These results stand in contrast to the assumptions in 
much of the tax competition literature and the beliefs of many concerned policymakers. 
2. A Model of Haven and Non-Haven Activity 
Consider the incentives facing a firm with the option of making a discrete investment in a 
tax haven location.  Part of the return to investing in the tax haven comes in the form of reducing 
the effective tax rate on the firm’s other foreign investments.  Let 1τ  denote the tax rate on the 
firm’s foreign investments outside of tax havens, and let 2τ  denote the effective tax rate on these 
profits if the firm also has a tax haven operation.  To the extent that the firm is able to use tax 
haven investments to reduce effective foreign tax rates on income earned outside of havens, it 
follows that 12 ττ ≤ . 
The firm produces output in countries other than tax havens with a production function 
( )21, KKQ , in which 1K  is the level of capital investment in non-havens, and 2K  is the level of 
investment in tax havens.  Firms are assumed to invest equity capital for which there is a shadow 
cost represented by λ .  The tax haven investment is taken to be discrete: the firm either invests 
zero, or else invests a fixed amount of capital given by *2K .  The return to the tax haven 
investment is earned in the tax haven itself (where it is denoted ( )*2~ KQ ) and possibly by 
augmenting profits earned in other foreign countries.  Finally, there is a firm-specific cost of 1c  
per unit of capital invested in foreign countries outside the tax haven, and a cost of 2c  per unit of 
capital invested in the tax haven. 
If the firm elects not to invest in the tax haven, its after-tax returns are given by: 
 3
(1)    ( ) ( ) 11111 0,1 KcKQ ′−′−≡ λτπ , 
in which 1K ′  is the profit-maximizing level of foreign investment, characterized by the first-order 
condition: 










If the firm instead chooses to invest in the tax haven, its returns are given by: 
(3)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*22*11*2*2*122 ~,1 KcKcKQKKQ +−+−≡ λτπ , 
in which *1K  satisfies: 













 The first-order conditions (2) and (4) together imply that 1K ′  and 
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Equation (5) identifies two channels by which the tax haven investment affects desired levels of 
investment in other countries.  The first comes from the tax rate reduction: since 12 ττ ≤ , it 
follows that the ratio in the first term on the right side of (5) is less than or equal to one, which 
implies that the favorable tax treatment afforded by tax havens may reduce the required pretax 
marginal product of capital for non-haven operations of firms that simultaneously invest in 
havens.  The second effect of tax haven investment appears through the impact of such 
investment on the marginal product of capital outside of havens. 
 Two extreme cases illustrate potential impacts of these two effects.  If the marginal 
product of capital in non-havens is not a function of the level of tax haven investment, or, more 
formally, if 



















; and if 12 ττ <  and the firm’s production function 
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exhibits the usual concavity in 1K , then the use of tax havens reduces the required marginal 
product of capital elsewhere, so, from (5), 1
*
1 KK ′> .  Alternative, it is possible that tax havens do 
not appreciably reduce effective foreign tax rates, so 2 1τ τ≅ ; and if the marginal product of 









KKQ ), then it follows that 1
*
1 KK ′< .  As these extreme cases make clear, the net 
effect of tax haven investment on non-haven investment is ambiguous theoretically and must be 
resolved empirically. 
 The firm’s optimization problem also suggests a method of evaluating the relationship 
between haven and non-haven investment, since if having a tax haven operation increases the 
desired level of non-haven investment (i.e., if 1
*
1 KK ′> ), then it is also the case that greater non-
haven investment increases the desirability of establishing a tax haven operation.  What is the 
impact on non-haven countries when an economic federation admits a tax haven as a new 
member country, thereby reducing the cost that taxpayers incur in obtaining tax benefits from tax 
haven operations?  In the context of the model, such a move is represented as a reduction in 2c , 
the cost of operating in the tax haven.  A change in tax regulations that reduces the cost of tax 
avoidance through haven operations is another example of a policy that reduces 2c .  Any 
reduction in 2c  increases the benefit ( )12 ππ −  associated with owning tax haven affiliates, 
thereby encouraging firms to establish new haven affiliates.  These new haven operations affect 
investment elsewhere insofar as *1K  differs from 1K ′ .  While it should be possible to estimate the 
effect of changes in 2c  on foreign investment in high-tax locations, the practical difficulty of 
identifying and measuring sufficient changes in the costs of using tax havens makes alternatives 
considerably more appealing.  One such alternative is to consider the effect of a change in 1c , the 
cost of investing in non-havens, on the likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate, which is 
an increasing function of ( )12 ππ − . 
Taking other features of the economic environment to be fixed, it is possible to write 
(maximized) firm profits with and without tax haven operations as functions of investment costs, 















∂ λπ .  Hence the change in ( )12 ππ −  as 1c  changes is given 
by: 













∂ λππ . 
Equation (6) indicates that, if 1
*
1 KK ′> , a reduced cost of investing in non-haven countries 
increases the likelihood of establishing tax haven operations.  Alternatively, if 1
*
1 KK ′< , a 
reduced cost of investing in non-haven countries decreases the likelihood of establishing tax 
haven operations.  Equation (6) suggests that by observing changes in demand for tax haven 
operations as 1c  changes, it is possible to infer the effect of tax haven operations themselves on 
investment elsewhere. 
3. Empirical Evidence 
In order to implement the empirical method suggested by equation (6) it is necessary to 
obtain a measure of 1c .  A natural candidate is Tobin’s q, the ratio of the market value of capital 
to its replacement cost, effectively a transformation of the user cost of capital. While Tobin’s q is 
notoriously difficult to measure, it is, in theory, directly related to investment and other measures 
of economic activity related to investment.  Taking the q model of investment to imply that 
qI β= , in which I is a firm’s investment level and β  a scalar, it follows that Iq 1−= β .  
Consequently, a firm’s level of foreign direct investment serves as a proxy for q, and therefore 
1c .  Of course, the endogeneity of investment to tax haven demand makes it necessary to use an 
instrument for investment in order to estimate the impact of costs in non-havens on the 
likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate. 
A natural instrument for the change in firm i’s level of foreign direct investment in non-
tax haven countries is the economic growth rate of the countries in which it invests, weighted by 
the levels of its initial investments.  This instrument reflects country differences in q: economies 
experiencing declining real costs of production, rising factor productivity, deregulatory episodes, 
or other changes that increase the rate of local economic growth are also ones in which foreign 
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investors face lower net costs and are likely to expand their operations.  Consequently, American 
firms that invested heavily in economies that subsequently grew quickly tend to exhibit more 
dramatic increases in foreign direct investment than do firms that instead invested heavily in 
economies that subsequently grew slowly.  Using this instrument, it is possible to evaluate the 
effect of predicted changes in foreign investment in non-havens on the likelihood of establishing 
a tax haven affiliate, thereby measuring the relationship expressed in equation (6). 
Desai, Foley and Hines (forthcoming) present results that implement this approach.  
While Desai, Foley and Hines interpret these results as confirming the effects of size of non-
haven activity on the demand for tax haven activities, it is possible to reinterpret their evidence 
in light of the model presented in section 2.  In their first-stage regressions, weighted GDP 
growth rates correlate positively with growth of sales and growth of capital stocks in the same 
regions, suggesting that GDP growth rates serve as reasonable instruments for changes in activity 
outside of tax havens.  The second stage regressions are fixed effect logit equations in which 
predicted values of changes in sales and capital stocks of non-haven affiliates are used as 
independent variables.  The dependent variable takes the value one if a firm has no tax haven 
affiliates in the region in the base period but has one or more tax haven affiliates in the region by 
the next period in the analysis.  The dependent variable is zero if a firm starts with one or more 
tax haven affiliates only to lose them subsequently.  Observations of firms that never have tax 
haven affiliates, and those that always have tax haven affiliates, are excluded from the sample.  
This procedure, developed by Chamberlain (1980), corresponds to a logit model with firm fixed 
effects and permits straightforward estimation of how changes in non-haven demand, induced by 
reduced costs of investing in such environments, affects the demand for tax haven operations. 
The results indicate that greater activity outside of tax havens is associated with greater 
demand for tax haven affiliates.  Firms whose initial investments were concentrated in 
economies that subsequently grew rapidly are the most likely to establish new tax haven 
affiliates.  The theory outlined in section 2 notes that this pattern implies that policies that reduce 
the cost of using tax haven operations should stimulate greater economic activity among foreign 
affiliates outside of tax havens.  The regressions imply that, when evaluated at sample means, a 
one percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate is associated with 0.5 to 0.7 
percent greater sales and investment growth outside of tax havens within the same region. 
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4. Conclusion 
 Contrary to many policy concerns and the assumptions of much of the tax competition 
literature, reduced costs of using tax havens do not appear to divert activity from non-havens.  
The empirical evidence indicates that firms facing reduced costs of establishing tax haven 
operations respond in part by expanding their foreign activities in nearby high-tax countries.  
Hence it appears that careful use of tax haven affiliates permits foreign investors to avoid some 
of the tax burdens imposed by domestic and foreign authorities, thereby maintaining foreign 
investment at levels exceeding those that would persist if tax havens were more costly. 
The available macroeconomic evidence indicates that countries have not reduced their 
taxation of foreign investment, or of capital income, to anything approximating the degree 
implied by many models of capital tax competition.  The use of tax havens by foreign investors 
may help to explain this empirical pattern, as high-tax countries are able to maintain high tax 
rates while continuing to draw significant levels of foreign investment.  It is not even necessary 
that high-tax countries are aware of the importance of tax havens in preserving their ability to 
attract foreign investment.  One further implication of this analysis is that tax harmonization 
within federations may actually foster, rather than restrict, tax competition.  Some initiatives to 
harmonize tax rates would effectively raise the costs that investors face in order to obtain the 
benefits of using tax havens, thereby reducing foreign investment in the region.  Downward 
pressure on national tax rates might well follow in an effort to attract investment, a process that 
could have been made less likely with the diversity afforded by allowing havens within a region. 
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